Reasons as relations
In What is prudence?, I wrote that "I take a reason to be a relational property, that relates some fact, some action, and possibly also some agent."
Let me explain that a bit further (though again, I'll ignore the agent part).
I take it that, for any reason, there are three relevant entities: a fact, a response, and the relationship between the two (a favourer, a favoured, and a favouring). (As an analogy: My being taller than you involves three entities: A me, a you, and the relationship between us.)
So I might say: "That my arm hurts is a reason to go to the doctor."
I take it that that means: "it is a fact that my arm hurts, there is my action of going to the doctor, and the former counts in favour of the latter". I take it that this last bit is the reason. It's this counting-in-favour-of relation that is a reason. Reasons therefore govern facts and actions, but aren't constituted by or identical to either.
Now some people will reject this. For we sometimes talk of "my arm hurting" as the reason I went to the doctor. That suggests that the reason I have is just this fact, and its supporting my action is something else (perhaps a property of that fact).
Here is the objection in more detail:
"If the reason is that your-arm's-hurting-favours-going-to-the-doctor then it looks your answer to the question "Why did you go to the doctor?" will be: "My arm's hurting favours going there". But I take it that when we're asking someone for their reason for doing something, we're looking for something that favoured their performing that action. That action's being favoured doesn't seem like it should be part of the answer to the question of what favoured it."
So you ask: "Why did you go to the doctor?"
One response is: "Because my arm hurt."
A second response would be: "Because that my arm hurt supported my going to the doctor"
I agree that the first response is far more natural, and my account seems to imply that we should opt for the second.
But I think we can put this down to conversational propriety. When you ask: "Why did you go to the doctor?", it is already implicit that you are looking for a reason, and you are looking for a reason that supported the action of going to the doctor. So I think that the second reply above is not so much false, as superfluous: we both already know two-thirds of what I say, so I'm better off just providing the part you don't know (the fact), and giving the first response. Saying that this fact is the reason is, I take it, elliptical for the claim that this is the interesting part of the reason.
(Why is all of this at all interesting? Precisely because it gives you a framework within which you can ask questions about what distinguishes kinds of reason, such as prudential reasons from moral reasons.)
I don't think this is your
I don't think this is your argument, but it should be pointed out that the fact that there are three relevant entities playing fundamental roles in the existence of reasons does not directly support your view. For any view that holds that the favoring property that an entity must have in order to be a reason is a background condition on that entity being a reason can explain the fundamental role of the favoring property and still allow that what constitutes the reason is something independent of the favoring property. For what it's worth, I think that this is the right way to go about it.
Also, I don't think the question you ask to test the naturalness is the best question to ask. So, if the naturalness of the first response is supposed to be explained by some type of pragmatic feature of conversation, then there should be some way to cancel the pragmatic feature. The most natural way to do this would be to directly ask what the person's reason was. Instead of asking "Why did you go to the doctor?" ask "What was your reason for going to the doctor?" Tellingly, I think, the first response is still much more natural--even though the person asking the question made explicit what she was pragmatically saying with the first question.
You might respond that the second question is ambiguous. One might be asking what one's motivating reason was, or one might be asking what one's normative reason was. It might be that motivating reasons are constituted by some other entity, one in which makes the first response is literally true. This ambiguity can be dealt with by changing the question to "What was your normative reason for going to the doctor?" Again tellingly, the first response sounds much more natural.
Finally, what do you say to arguments a la Dancy about positing two kinds of reasons? If normative reasons are constituted by the favoring property, what are motivating reasons constituted by? It is prima facie implausible that they're constituted by the favoring property, since we can have motivating reasons that aren't normative reasons. And if those motivating reasons aren't normative reasons, then they don't have the favoring property.
Hi Errol, Thanks for the
Hi Errol,
Thanks for the very good reply.
Let me see I have your view correct: Some facts stand in a favouring relation to some actions, and the facts that do this, are reasons. Is that right? (Analogy: One gets to be a Radiohead fan by standing in the fan relationship to Radiohead; but obviously being a Radiohead fan is not identical to this relationship itself.)
If so, that's certainly a possibility I hadn't thought of. But perhaps there's not so much to argue about here. We both agree that some facts stand in a favouring relation to some actions. The difference is then whether we refer to the facts in this relation as a "reason", or whether we refer to the favouring itself as a "reason". But perhaps this is just a terminological dispute not worth bothering about.
That said, I can certainly see why you might think "reason" is normally used in your way rather than mine. I'll have to think about this.
Still, I think I can respond to your objection to my claims about conversational propriety. For when you ask "What was your reason for going to the doctor?", the same feature I was worried about is still present: You've already laid out the action that was supported, so all that remains to be disclosed is the fact that supported it. I think that a question that avoids all implication would be: "What was your reason just now?", where it's not obvious what action the questioner is referring to. Then it seems to me that the natural response will be something like "Well my arm hurt, so I thought I'd better see the doctor, if that's what you mean." This doesn't support my account, but I don't think it harms it either.
On motivating vs normative reasons, there's a lot to say here. Could you explain how this is a special problem for my account, rather than an unrelated issue? (Though I have been meaning to write something on motivation for ages, maybe I'll do that next.)
Alex
Let me see I have your view
Let me see I have your view correct: Some facts stand in a favouring relation to some actions, and the facts that do this, are reasons. Is that right?
Well, my really real view is that propositions are what constitute the reasons. But here I will be agnostic between the view that facts do and the view that propositions do and the view that states of affairs do. The point is this: It still can be true that in order for entity E to be a reason to phi, E must have the following property: E favors phi-ing. Just like one must be born on U.S. soil to be President of the U.S., E must favor phi-ing. But it doesn't follow from the fact that E must favor phi-ing to the conclusion that the favoring property is identical to the reason any more than it follows from the fact that one must be born on U.S. soil to be U.S. President to the conclusion that being born in the U.S. is identical to being the U.S. President. The former facts are background conditions that must obtain if the latter facts are to exist (or, on the view that I endorse, the truth of the former propositions must obtain in order for the latter propositions to be true).
I don't think it's a terminological dispute, and I do think it's worth bothering about. This is where the motivating reasons discussion comes in. If Dancy is right at the beginning of Practical Reality, we should be weary of theories of normative and motivating reasons that hold that those two sets of reasons are constituted by different things. I think it follows from this that we should be weary of your view. For I don't see how it can be that motivating reasons are constituted by the favoring property. That's because sometimes our motivating reasons aren't normative reasons. Since these reasons aren't normative, they don't have the favoring property. Thus, they must be constituted by something other than the favoring property.
Of course, this is also a problem for the view that facts constitute normative reasons (as long as we don't radically change our philosophy of mind). I don't think it's a problem for the view that propositions constitute normative reasons (and we don't have to revise our views in the philosophy of mind. hooray!)
I've been meaning to read
I've been meaning to read Practical Reality more thoroughly for a while, so I might be missing something in some of the following.
So, first, I think that the dispute between the view that facts are reasons, and the view that relationships between facts and actions are reasons, is terminological. This is true, even though the dispute between these views and your view that reasons are propositions is certainly not terminological. For the issue you raise with respect to motivating reasons arises for any view which thinks that normative reasons are constituted by facts, properties, events, whatever. All of these things won't exist when the agent has no reason. So it doesn't seem to me that this is a bigger problem for my view than it is for the one that you raised but don't actually endorse.
Indeed, presumably this is part of the appeal of thinking of propositions as reasons: Propositions exist even when they're false. So agents who act for no reason presumably, on your view, act for false propositions. (So I imagine you say.) But I tend to think that propositions are just the wrong sort of thing to be reasons: it is, to say the least, revisionary to think that people act because of such abstract entities as propositions rather than facts such as her pain. That means that some other solution to these problems is desirable.
So, as I imply in the post An Argument on Motivating Reasons, I suspect that we should deny at least one of the assumptions that:
1) All actions should be explained the same way.
2) Statements about reasons are factive.
So you might reject (1), thinking that motivating reasons are facts when the agent acts rightly, and beliefs when they act wrongly. McNaughton thought this at one point.
On the other hand, you might reject (2), and think that explanations of action are non-factive. That means that agents always act for normative reasons, but sometimes those normative reasons are not the case. So statements about beliefs are non-factive: If I say that you believe that Santa exists, that the content of your belief contains Santa doesn't imply that there is a Santa for your belief to be about. Similarly, it might be that if you write to Santa because he'll send you presents, this being your normative reason for action doesn't imply that it is a fact that Santa will send you presents.
I don't have a strong opinion with respect to choosing between these, but I think that either is preferable to thinking of reasons as propositions. Though, as I say, I need to think and read about all this some more, so please correct any silly mistakes I'm making.
Alex
It's certainly true that
It's certainly true that there is a greater chance that the dispute between your view and the facts as reasons view is terminological. Let me say, however, that I still don't think it is. For if it were, various solutions to the motivating/normative issue we're discussing would seem equally attractive to both views. I really doubt that is the case, but I won't pursue it here.
Also, I think it deserves to be mentioned that it is not uncontroversial that the fact that her arm is in pain is identical to her pain. Moreover, I think that there is an argument to be made that the way we talk about normative reasons doesn't favor any of the views we've been discussing. I need to think about this more, though.
Finally, I'll actually make some claims. I'll grant that the propositional view might not be the most intuitive. I don't find it counter-intuitive, and some great philosophers don't either, but I grant that some people do. Moreover, I deny (2) (more on that in the next paragraph), but I think that the following view is really ugly: 'On the other hand, you might reject (2), and think that explanations of action are non-factive. That means that agents always act for normative reasons, but sometimes those normative reasons are not the case.' If you can make sense to what that second sentence actually means, then you've done better than Dancy. Moreover, I think (and I've argued elsewhere) that the only view that doesn't force us to reject very plausible views in the philosophy of mind and epistemology is the propositional view.
Finally, and this might be better placed in the other post, but the argument for the conclusion that beliefs are motivating reasons you cite in the other post is really lousy. It's something like this:
(1) All motivating reasons are constituted by the same type of thing.
(2) It's sometimes felicitous to say 'He phi-ed because he believed that the house was on fire.'
(C) Therefore, motivating reasons are constituted by beliefs.
The problem with this argument is that there is a compelling explanation for the second premise that is neutral between the views. Namely, it's very plausible that when you assert p, you implicate that you believe p. One way to cancel this implication is to make it clear that you don't believe p. All of the relevant cases are cases where, e.g., the house wasn't on fire. But if the speaker knows the house wasn't on fire, then it's natural for him to cancel the usual implication by saying that the agent who acted believed the house was on fire. Moreover, in all cases where the speaker knows that, e.g., the house was on fire, the speaker will violate a Gricean maxim by saying 'He phi-ed because he believed the house was on fire.' (It depends on the context, I think, which maxim he violates)
"That means that agents
"That means that agents always act for normative reasons, but sometimes those normative reasons are not the case.' If you can make sense to what that second sentence actually means, then you've done better than Dancy."
I certainly can't do the details. But I take it that the broad point is easily enough understood: We typically think that to give an explanation, you talk about something that exists, and how it led to the thing you're trying to explain. But perhaps this first part isn't a requirement on explanations per se: some things are to be explained by non-existent things. In particular, perhaps actions are sometimes explained by things that are not the case, but which the agent believed.
Now you might think it generally suspicious that you can explain something by a nothing. But it isn't so implausible: Negative causation may be possible, as when you explain a death by lack of water. Or mathematical explanation may not require existence in any standard sense: that 1+1=2 might explain why 2-1=1, even though the former doesn't exist, as such. These examples are certainly extremely contentious, but they are sufficient to show that this position in this domain is not ad hoc.
So as I say, I can't do the details. But I don't think that I've seen anything to rule out this position as possibility before we begin.
"Moreover, I think (and I've argued elsewhere) that the only view that doesn't force us to reject very plausible views in the philosophy of mind and epistemology is the propositional view."
I replied to the second half here. As I say there, I think it's quite natural, even if unpopular, to think that beliefs aren't about propositions.
Alex