Humeanism again

Hey Alex, I appreciate the helpful citation. I've read the chapters you recommended, it's good stuff and now I feel I ought to read the entire book.

But to reply to your very good question:

My sense is that Hampton might argue your (i) will be true only if you accept, not (ii), but:

(iii) R'(e->Rm).

...where R' is the reason given by one's commitment to the normative rule stated in (i), whereas R is the reason given by the end that one desires.

So my sense is that Hampton will argue for the truth of the following conditional:

(iv) (e->Rm) -> (R'(e->Rm))

...or to abbreviate using our roman numeral names:

(iv) (i)->(iii)

But I cannot answer your question head on--I cannot show how your (i) implies or presupposes my (iii). Let me suggest that this is because (i) and (iii) are not statements of the right form. As stated, (i) and (iii) ascribe reasons to agents under certain conditions, and from a third-personal standpoint. I suspect Hampton's argument can be seen clearly only when it is run from the first-personal deliberative standpoint, from the perspective of the agent who is using these reasons normatively to guide their course of action.

So, take someone, Adam, who engages in instrumental deliberation, let's say the following:

(1) I shall save my kidnapped child.
(2) To save my kidnapped child I must pay the ransom.
(3) So, I shall pay the ransom.

...where (1) states the propositional content of Adam's desire adopted as end, (2) states the content of his means-end belief, and (3) is his intention formed on the basis of (1) and (2).

As I see it, Hampton's curmudgeon is someone who has the requisite desire and the means-end belief, but is either unable or refuses to acknowledge the normative force of concluding (3). It is possible for the curmudgeon to do this because (3) does not follow from (1) and (2) alone, but from premisses (1) and (2) according to a rule of inference that Hampton calls the instrumental norm.

It may be helpful to see Hampton's curmudgeon as the practical counterpart of Lewis Carroll's tortoise, in his "What the Tortoise Said to Achilles". Just as in theoretical reasoning the conclusion follows from the premisses in accordance with various rules of inference, so it is too in instrumental reasoning. A complete statement of why we ought to accept the conclusion seems to require mentioning the rules of inference as reasons along with the premisses. That's what I take statement (iv) above to be doing.

There are various complications here that I can't address: Lewis Carroll's worry of infinite regress, Schroeder's distinction between reasons and background conditions, and so on. I need to think about these more deeply. But I will address a couple of points.

One complication comes from what Kant says about the analyticity of the instrumental norm. Kant says in his Groundwork: "it is an analytic proposition that, if I fully will the effect, then I must also will the action necessary to produce it" (Beck tans). If this is analytically true, then there will be no inferential gap between (1) and (2) on one hand, and (3) on the other. So the curmudgeon will be inconceivable, just like the married bachelor.

Hampton addresses this complication in her book THE AUTHORITY OF REASON, Ch.4. I will add this. If the instrumental norm is analytically true, then it will be impossible to violate it (just as a bachelor cannot fail to be unmarried). But it is meant to be a normative principle guiding our conduct, as Kant himself emphasizes. It is something we can fail to follow, and we can acknowledge such failures as rationally blameworthy. So my suggestion is that Kant gets the analytical proposition by trivializing the instrumental norm. If the instrumental norm is "Take the indispensably necessary means to your end!" then that does seem analytic, because without intending to take the steps necessary to realizing the end I cannot intend to realize the end. But the instrumental norm is a bit more demanding and complicated than that. Hampton's formulation is "Take the most effective means to your end!", and that involves comparison of various alternatives, none of which is necessary, but one of which is sufficient, to realizing the end. E.g., Adam would deliberate on whether to pay the ransom, or to report to the police, or to do both, and so on. Such a norm we can fail to follow, and we would be blameworthy if we committed ourselves to such a norm. But it also seems to me that there is room for disagreement as to what this more substantive and demanding instrumental norm is, and also that one can reject it altogether or restrict in scope (e.g., not "Maximize!" but "Satisfice!").

Last point I want to add is that commitment to rules of practical inference, the stable and reflective disposition to infer practical conclusions from certain beliefs and desires, also gives us reasons. A psychological account of such commitment seems to be possible, and I think Hume and Gibbard go a long way in providing such an account, though Hampton doesn't think so.

I enjoyed thinking about these issues. Sorry for the very long comment :)