Dancy on table-scepticism

"But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action" (Hume Book 3, Part I, Section I)

"But can there be any difficulty in proving, that whether something is a table is not a matter of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any object allow'd to be a table: This one, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call its being a table. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain shapes, sizes, textures and colours of its component parts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. Its being a table entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of respect-for-tableness, which arises in you, towards this object" (Dancy's Moral Reasons, p75)

The former argument can't be valid, given that the latter isn't. As Dancy points out, Hume assumes that the moral properties will be found amongst the other properties of the act, not resultant from them or constituted by them.

A table is a certain arrangement of other properties; tableness doesn't appear in addition to those properties. Similarly, moral properties are certain arrangements of other properties, not something in addition to them.