Epistempolicy part 2: Politics

In part one, I distinguished two views, M, and E. M is my own moral view. E is the view that accurately combines my confidence in various views being true with their implications, and so appropriately tells me what to do to maximise expected rightness of my acts. I previously finished with a question: How ought I live? By M, or by E?

In the personal case, I'm tempted by E. But let's put that aside. What about in the political case?

The fact that other people disgree with you should lower your confidence in your own view. If you were both equally good at truth-spotting, then there's no reason to think that they're mistaken rather than you. It's not the case that everyone is equally good at truth-spotting, but it still remains true that disagreement should make you double-check your views.

So perhaps, given enough knowledge of everyone's views, we'd all come to the same E. Call this E+. It's the view that accurately combines everyone's E given how good they are at truth-spotting, and puts all this together for a kind of civilisation's-expected-rightness for any action.

I want to say that E+ is politics. Democracy is a bizarre (but potentially least bad) way of getting at what E+ is. You can't weight votes according to ability to spot the truth, for numerous practical reasons. But weighting them equally gives us something, and it might be as close to the ideal of E+ as we can get.

This view amounts to the claim that politics is just ethics once we appropriately epistemically weigh our normative commitments. The collective nature of the political enterprise results from the fact that epistemic weighting is going to depend on what others think.

So that's the start of a view. This certainly needs a lot of work. But in it's favour is that:
a) It captures the fact that ethics should be relevant to politics.
b) It is parsimonious since it makes political reasons dependent on moral reasons.
c) It captures the collective nature of political decision making, and justifies democracy, without the need to posit any controversial values.
d) It explains why democratic decisions don't always come out correctly. When majorities vote badly, it's possible that the problem is that the majority are the worst at spotting the truth. Since that's what matters, majoritarianism does not rule (overrulling majority decisions might be permissible, depending very heavily on numerous pragmatic considerations).

That's the plus side. What's the negative?