Practical and Theoretical Reasoning?
People standardly distinguish practical from theoretical reasoning. The former concerns actions, the latter beliefs. As an example, my reasoning about what I should do is different from your reasoning about what I am likely to do. The former is practical, the latter theoretical.
But adopting a belief is an action. If that's true, then theoretical reasoning is merely one kind of practical reasoning; it's the kind of practical reasoning that involves actions of the unique kind adopting beliefs.
Stronger still, it's one kind of practical reasoning no more special than left-arm reasoning, which is reasoning about action kinds to do with one's left arm. That's a unique category of actions too.
Perhaps something has gone wrong? There is no distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. There is reasoning to actions; and some actions are adoptions of beliefs. That is all.
All good reason to deny that
All good reason to deny that settling on a belief is an action. (It doesn't issue from an intention, for another thing, and one cannot follow 'practical' or value-based reasons in settling on belief, as one can for actions.)
I thought about this as I
I thought about this as I wrote the post, but I don't think it's true that the adoption of a belief isn't an action. On your points:
First, many (non-believing) actions don't issue from intentions - blinking, reactions, and so on. There might be a distinction between actions that stem from intentions and those that don't, but this cuts across the traditional practical/theoretical divide.
That beliefs can't depend on "practical" values is question-begging, in the sense that precisely what is under question is the existence of distinctly "practical" values. Of course, one can set on beliefs for generally value-based reasons: I believe things that are true because I think that true beliefs have value.
Al
1. Non-intentional reactions
1. Non-intentional reactions do not result from reasoning, so they don't seem relevant to the present discussion.
2. Actually, I think the standard view these days is that one doesn't (and cannot) believe for value-based reasons. [See, e.g., Raz.] After all, beliefs do not have value just in virtue of being true. Many are perfectly worthless. (Supposing I've a true belief that P, there's no further value in believing the also-true "~~P", or "P and (Q v ~Q)", etc. But if I stop to think about them, I will certainly believe them nonetheless!) Truth and value can diverge both ways, and epistemic reasons always follow the former.
Thanks again for the
Thanks again for the interesting thoughts! But I'm still not convinced:
1) I think that there's two ways to go here (and perhaps I initially picked the wrong one). Either one can claim that actions of blinking and so on do stem from implicit reasoning (my eyes hurt: time to blink), or one can claim that belief formation does stem from intentions.
The former claim is the one I originally went for, and I suspect some would agree that if it is an action at all (and not mere happening) then it must be true that, in some sense, reasoning led me to do it.
But perhaps the latter is more agreeable: Which beliefs one forms obviously does depend on one's intentions. If I intend to adopt only true beliefs, I'll end up with some set of beliefs, if I intend to adopt no false beliefs, I'll end up with a different set. Different people really do have different intentions with respect to belief formation than others - some are more guarded, others ambitious; some aim to get everything or nothing right, others aim to minimise error.
2) To be blunt: I'm not convinced that believing P and ~~P is no more valuable than simply believing P. Perhaps that won't convince you if you don't share that intuition. But there are other responses I can take here too: First, buck-passers can't appeal to a value/reasons distinction, so buck-passers are comitted to claiming that this cannot be the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning.
Second stronger, as the first point indicates, if there's a distinction between value-based reasoning and reasons-based reasoning, it cuts across the practical/theoretical divide. It's possible that many pieces of practical reasoning are not value-driven, but these do not thereby become instances of theoretical reasoning.
Al
Types of reasons
Here's a better way to develop my earlier point: there seem to be important differences between reasons for belief and reasons for action. For example, if doing so will serve human welfare, this could be a reason to raise your left arm, jiggle your foot, leap in the air, or perform any other action whatsoever (incl. taking a pill to bring yourself to believe that p). But it is not a reason to believe that p, unless it constitutes evidence that p is true. This suggests that epistemic reasons are different in kind from other sorts of reasons (i.e. practical reasons).
I certainly agree that there
I certainly agree that there are various grounds for reasoning, so that some pieces of reasoning share common grounds and others do not. One might perform a single action for a variety of grounds under different circumstances: I might believe that P because it is true, or I might believe it because doing so serves human welfare.
But there are different grounds within 'practical' and 'theoretical' reasoning. If this is the only distinction at hand here, then there is no greater difference between true-belief reasoning and human-welfare reasoning than there is between, say, human-welfare grounded reasoning, and human-freedom grounded reasoning.
But perhaps I have missed your point?
Al