Morality, art, humour and food
Moral objectivism is relatively popular these days. Many of the standard arguments against it are now considered to be rather weak.
But what about other areas where we might not want to be objectivists? There's a slippery slope here, through art, humour, and then food. The idea that some art is objectively better than others is controversial. The idea that some humour is superior to others is a little barmy. And the claim that there is a correct view on the niceness of bananas seems outright absurd. But how do we decide where to draw the line? The arguments you might want to advance against the idea of objectivity in these domains are the very same arguments that seem weak in the moral case.
So, for the moral objectivists out there, what's your view on the objectivity of standards for art, humour or food? Are there objective standards for these too? If not, what marks the difference with these from morality?
Art
We should look for objective moral standards when we have allowed ourselves to look past our social prejudices and can contemplate in a truly neutral sense: what is best and the most consistently fair for everyone?
Hume recognised something similar for art. Once we have freed ourselves of prejudices (lack of experience, by the way, should really be considered a prejudice as there's no way one can make a neutral judgment when they've only seen one side of the story, so to speak) we should and will find that everyones' tastes are the same (so typically experienced critics and people in different ages are the best judges - and these two types of peoples' tastes should and will accord). I don't think I'll go in to food for the moment.
Anyway, as Kant suggested, the universal assent we eventually find allows us to postulate a kind of 'supersensible' harmonious substrate across the species.
While people will disagree on what is morally and aesthetically the best (or if there even is a 'best') we cannot deny that there is a state - moral or aesthetic - which will bring about the most happiness.
If I had to guess, I'd say that the reason moral objectivism is less controversial than aesthetic objectivism is because an aesthetic dissenter doesn't pose any kind of a threat to the rest of society. A moral dissenter does. There's nothing dangerous about saying the Mona Lisa sucks, where as it is dangerous to promote racism and paedophilia.
Aesthetic judgments are more subjective in the sense that they don't affect anyone else, where as morality seems to be all about how your actions affect others. (Although perhaps it could be argued that allowing crappy art to be produced is immoral?)
Hi, thanks for the
Hi, thanks for the comment!
A couple of points spring to mind:
a) What brings about the most happiness and what is morally or aesthetically 'best' are potentially independent. If that's true, then how are facts about happiness maximisation relevant?
b) Moral subjectivism might have negative consequences for the well-being of society. But given that well-being seems like a moral notion, wouldn't the relevant comparison case be the aesthetic effects on society of aesthetic subjectivism? Comparing the effects on well-being of moral and aesthetic subjectivism seems to be stacking the books from the start. I suspect that there may be some way around this worry, though I'd like to see you spell it out.
Al
In reply to (a): I suppose
In reply to (a): I suppose happiness itself isn't really what matters. What matters is freeing yourself of prejudice and making your judgments as disinterested as possible. While some people might, on a personal level, find what is 'right' to be disagreeable, we will probably find that, regardless, all disinterested judgments will accord.
For morality I can think of an example of this which I encounter at least weekly. I often convince acquaintances (when they challenge me) of the wrong they're doing by consuming animal products. I bring them to total agreement - but this doesn't stop them (in fact, it seems to me that the only people who will change their habits according to reason are philosophers).
It seems to me that the reason peoples' subjective judgments don't accord with the judgments they will make when achieving a state of disinterestedness is because - this is what Kant suggested - their sentiment is being tainted by charm and superficial 'agreeable' interests. e.g. think of the difference between a painting of a bowl of fruit and a plain photo of a bowl of fruit which emits pleasant, fruity aromas. Which are you appreciating for its intrinsic beauty and which are you appreciating for its interested, merely agreeable sensations? If you had a full stomach you probably wouldn't take much notice of the nice smelling photo. Examples which are common in real life are things like nostalgia and perhaps movies which manipulate base emotions by having, let's say, little Timmy dying in a tragic way.
I suppose the way to put all this to the test is just to find which art people appreciate (not necessarily like on a personal level) after years have passed and experience has been acquired by the individual judges.
So yeah, I suppose I was conflating 'happiness' and 'right'. But obviously this is by no means anywhere near a full treatment of the topic. Aesthetics is a weird one.
In reply to (b) (assuming I've read your question right, please correct me if I haven't): Yes, you're right. Aesthetic subjectivism could have adverse effects on the 'aesthetic society' but not on well being (in the way moral subjectivism would). What I'm saying though is that when someone is experiencing pain or depression or whatever (as a result of a moral subjectivist [nihilist, even]) it is very obvious. When aesthetic society goes downhill it is not so immediately obvious because you don't have people screaming and bleeding. People can still pursue pleasure and happiness in other ways where as a morally just society seems instrumental to the pursuit of pleasure and happiness. *That* is probably why aesthetic subjectivism is more controversial. It just isn't as obvious to people when art sucks.
Anyway, I don't think happiness and beauty (and, come to think of it - well being) are actually that independent. I think they are analogous and overlap. I attempted a piece about it a while ago - http://aaronweingott.blogspot.com/2008/01/happiness-and-kantian-aestheti...
Hope that helps :) (sorry about the long comment!)