What is the fundamental bearer of moral properties?
One answer to this question suggests that actions are: Actions are right and wrong, and if we want to assess, say, agents or states of affairs, we do so by considering the actions that they perform or contain.
A second answer suggests that character traits, or people, are: Agents are good or bad, and if we want to assess, say, actions or states of affairs, we do so by considering the character traits that generated them or that are contained in them.
A third answer suggests that states of affairs are: States of affairs are better or worse, and if we want to assess, say, actions or character traits, we do so by considering the states of affairs that they do or tend to generate.
That is, we might be deontologists, virtue-ethicists, or consequentialists, broadly speaking.
But we we missed any options out? If there are other entities that might plausible be the fundamental bearers of moral properties, then there are additional families of views that we have yet to consider.
So what else is there?
One suggestion might be that lives can be good or bad. A good action is one in a good life; a good character trait is one often found in good lives, and a good state of affairs is one in which there are many good lives. Is this plausible? Are there other possibilities?
Does it not make more sense
Does it not make more sense to say 'intentions' rather than 'actions, or are you considering the reasons and motivations for the act as part of the act itself?
Is it not the case that when people generally judge a person or his actions, it is his intentions that are most important? We do not criticise an act which appears at first sight 'bad' if the agent 'meant well'.
This suggests to me that it is thoughts (for what else is an intention, reason or motivation?) which are the ultimate bearers of moral value - which is interesting, no?
Well I had imagined that
Well I had imagined that intentions reduce to either actions in the manner you suggest, or really count as character traits.
But, if I'm honest, I think that this is mere assertion that intentions are not fundamental bearers of moral properties. You could quite legitimately claim that this is false, and that the merit of actions and character traits and so on all reduces to merit in intention. That is, your suggestion is a good one that I should have mentioned.
Of course, I'm sceptical that everything could reduce to intentions in this way. Some of the worst people in history are those who act with the best intentions. We don't want to excuse any act, no matter how evil, so long as the agent was depraved enough not to notice.
Al