A "Parity" Argument
Here's something I've been thinking about recently, and I'm very keen to have thoughts on. I can't decide whether this is a good (original) argument, or whether there's something deeply wrong with it.
For now I'll just try to get the gist across: if it's deeply wrong, it will be visible from here. In the future I may well come to discuss particular premises.
1) There is some distinction between prudential reasons and moral reasons (e.g. reasons to do things for oneself, and reasons to do things for others).
2) Prudential reasons are all reasons to increase one's level of well-being.
3) Premise 2 needs an explanation.
4) The only (plausible, non ad-hoc) explanation of Premise 2 is that all practical reasons are reasons to increase levels of well-being.
5) All practical reasons are reasons to increase levels of well-being.
So:
6) Moral reasons are all reasons to increase the general level of well-being.
Here's the brief English version:
All the things that you should do for yourself, and the only things you should for yourself are things that increase your level of well-being. But there's something a bit mysterious about this fact: it needs explaining. One obvious explanation - if not the only explanation - is that all "should" claims (at least all those about action) are made true by facts about increased levels of well-being. But if that's true, then it follows pretty trivially that the moral should is also one of increasing well-being.
That is, some form of welfarist consequentialism is true.
Interesting
Here's a worry: it seems that there are non-welfare (e.g. perfectionist) reasons that speak to our self-treatment. We have some reason to develop our talents, strive for excellence, etc., independently of whether doing so makes us better off.
So, either premise 2 is false, or else 'prudential reasons' are just being stipulatively restricted to 'reasons that derive from our welfare interests', in which case premises 3 and 4 are false.
Here are two other
Here are two other worries.
First, it seems that a parallel argument with the same form can be given for the reverse conclusion.
1) There is some distinction between prudential reasons and moral reasons (e.g. reasons to do things for oneself, and reasons to do things for others).
2) Moral reasons are all reasons (say) to treat others with equal concern and respect.
3) Premise 2 needs an explanation.
4) The only (plausible, non ad-hoc) explanation of Premise 2 is that all practical reasons are reasons to treat others with equal concern and respect.
5) All practical reasons are reasons to treat others with equal concern and respect.
So:
6) Prudential reasons are all reasons to treat others with equal concern and respect.
(If you don't think moral reasons are all reasons to treat others with equal concern and respect, just replace that formula with your favorite characterization of morality.)
Secondly, to the extent that we can explain that reasons of some kind (e.g., prudential) all require some things from us by claiming that all practical reasons do so, it seems that we can equally explain that explanandum by claiming that all reasons, whether practical or theoretical, require that from us. In other words, if your argument allows you to move from prudential reasons to practical reasons, why doesn't it allow you to move all the way down to reasons simpliciter?
Hi Pablo, thanks for the two
Hi Pablo, thanks for the two excellent objections.
The first objection had occured to me previously. But it doesn't worry me. First, it's a general philosophical point that arguments can be turned on their heads. This was Moore's point on scepticism. You sometimes hear people say that "One man's modus ponens is another's modus tollens", and this is simply a local instance of that more general phenomenon.
On this issue, all we can ask is which set of premises we have greater credence in, independently of the pair of arguments in question. In this case: Do we have firmer knowledge of prudential reasons or moral reasons? As I say, I've been giving this some thought; I lean towards the former option, and will try to defend that claim in a post on it in the near future.
The second objection is very pressing. A handful of thoughts, which I do not deny fail to adequately quash the worry:
a) One could simply accept the implication. This would have the bizarre implication of rendering all theoretical reasons similarly grounded, though I would guess some have defended such a view before now. (If I were to stand by my comments here, I may be forced to take this option)
b) Another option is to reject premise (3) when it is pressed regarding a property of practical reasons. One might think that practical reasons are as they are, and cannot be explained by reference to anything else. (Of course, someone could say the same about the original premise 3 - but I am not so sure it is as plausible here).
c) A final option would be to claim that the only reasons we have are practical ones, and that theoretical reasons are misnamed. Then one could accept the implication, but deny that this implied anything about theoretical "reasons". Some claim that the proper aim of belief is truth, or somesuch, and one might try to claim this story doesn't require reasons, as such. (I commit myself to against this response, here)
Al
Hi Richard, thanks for the
Hi Richard, thanks for the interesting objection.
There are two possible responses I can make here. I'm more tempted by the first, but if I'm forced to accept the second, that doesn't worry me too much.
1) You've drawn a false contrast. Perfectionist reasons are reasons to increase one's well-being. The reason we have to strive for excellence is that an agent who excels is better off than one who does not. So in a sense you are correct to assert that excellence matters, but incorrect to infer from this that things other than well-being matter.
Of course, the wider I cast the net of "well-being", the less determinate the argument is. At worst, I may be forced to retreat to:
2) Perfectionism may be true in the prudential case. Then the argument just broadens to establish that we morally ought to be pluralists, torn between perfectionism and welfarist consequentialism. I don't find this too implausible, and the argument still has its bite against those who want to reject all theories in this area.
Al