Why be a utilitarian?
There are two striking features of utilitarianism. The first is the sheer number of arguments against it. There must be more putative counterexamples to utilitarianism than to any other theory in philosophy.
The second though, is that it's still somewhat popular. Given the number of objections, you might think it amazing that anyone should still believe such a theory.
There are two lessons we can draw from this combination of facts. The first is that many people are stupid, and will believe anything.
The second is a more interesting possibility. Perhaps, despite the numerous objections to utilitarianism, there's something very forceful to be said in its favour. No doubt if such an argument were conscious, it would have fallen into print by now. But perhaps there's some element of truth in utilitarianism that's never quite been spelled out - even by its supporters. Perhaps there is an issue lurking here that one needs to address is one wants to show utilitarianism to be false (or true, for that matter).
The trouble, of course, is working out what that grain of truth is.
quantity vs. quality
Would should the "sheer number" of attempted counterarguments matter? Surely what matters is whether they're any good. (Resisting an onslaught of bad objections would not qualify one as "stupid".)
P.S. Aren't you a maximizing consequentialist? For it seems that most of the objections are to this element of utilitarianism, rather than to its account of the end to be maximized (human welfare).
Typos! -- Why, oh why
Sorry, that first 'Would' would have done better to be 'Why'. I mustn't be quite awake yet.
I should have written that
I should have written that many of these arguments are also forceful. It is true that there are many objections that are probably unsound, but it's also true that there are some objections that have never been adequately dealt with. (Aside from calling them "mere intuitions" that is; as if it were clear what such things were and also clear how the utilitarian wasn't appealing to any such thing.)
I have much sympathy toward act-consequentialism, yes. Just how many objections to utilitarianism are also objections to act-consequentialism depends on a number of things: most obviously, what it is we mean by "human welfare", and what constraints there are on the breadth of consequentialist axiology.
One can, of course, think that a theory is persuasive and yet concede that there are deep problems with it. Perhaps my view is that act-consequentialism is the least troubled theory out there, which is obviously not the same as thinking that it is true in its current form.
(At some point I'll write something on the best objections to utilitarianism. For the time-being it's been utilitarianism overkill here recently, so I'll switch topics for a bit.)
Alex
the appeal of consequentialism
Utilitarianism is appealing primarily because consequentialism is. (That is why, although most hedonists are consequentialists, the converse doesn't hold.) And consequentialism is appealing because, as Philippa Foot nicely put it, it captures the intuition that it is never right to intend a worse outcome when you can intend a better one instead. (Satisficing rather than maximizing consequentialism does not capture this intuition. That's why most consequentialists are maximizers rather than satisficers.) Some authors have found this intuition so compelling that they have elevated it to the status of a self-evident principle. This explains, I believe, why consequentialism is still a relatively popular theory nowadays in spite of the numerous objections that have been raised against it.
On these lines, you might
On these lines, you might enjoy Rob Shaver's 'The Appeal of Utilitarianism', Utilitas (2004)
The riddle is thus: if
The riddle is thus: if consequentialism is so obviously wrong, then why does it still seem so obviously right?
The answer is that consequentialism is convincing in direct proportion to its emptiness. When you look at the basic principle , as in the Foot quotation, it does indeed appear to be self-evidently true - but all you are saying is that it's good to act for the best. This looks right to most of us - deontological theories are, in fact, hugely counter-intuitive.
Consequentialists always run into trouble, though, when they try to define which actions will be for the best and how we can know that before we act.
As a principle, it is hard to deny, but essentially empty; as full fleshed-out theories, interesting but hard to support.