Falsehoods can be interesting
I just noticed some comments over at Philosophy Etc on "Structural Incentives in Academic Work" which are interesting, but, I believe false.
Here's Pablo:
"I find Lewis's writings--all of them--shockingly brilliant. It gives me enormous pleasure to read what he writes. I am always impressed by his cleverness and his inventiveness. And I really, really want his views to be true, since I derive great cognitive comfort from believing in elegant theories. But do I think his views are more likely to be true than those of other philosophers? Well, let me answer with a little thought experiment. Suppose that somehow a superintelligence was created that could tell us the true answer to every philosophical question. And suppose that, before the answers were disclosed to the philosophical community, a “philosophy prediction market” was created—Philtrade—allowing traders to bet for different candidates. Would I buy Lewis stock? No. Nor do I think that there would be any discernible correlation between the “price” of a particular answer and the professional success of its proponent."
This is an interesting thought experiment, but misleading. From "Lewis's work is unlikely to be correct" (assuming that this is true), it doesn't follow that "Lewis's work is a waste of time" (which was the worry of the original post).
First, given that philosophy has been studied for some time now, and not too much has been finally solved, it's unlikely that we'll hit upon the answers on any day soon. So if you're studying philosophy with the aim of saying something that highly likely to be true, you're irrational.
"Ah, but some theories are more or less likely to be true than others!". Yes, that is true. But it still doesn't get us the conclusion that Lewis wasted his time. Sometimes, the most interesting papers are those that say something so very obviously false. I find myself most engaged in philosophy when I'm given a strong argument for a terrible conclusion. In some ways, that's what a paradox is, and those form the meat of much of philosophy.
So second, seeing where strong arguments go wrong can be illuminating. The Gambler's fallacy makes a nice example here. When you finally get to the age where you grasp exactly why this is a fallacy, you've gained a lot of insight into the nature of probability. Equally, seeing where Lewis's reasoning goes wrong, might give us great insight into philosophy. Studying falsehoods can get you much closer to truth.
A third point is that philosophers shouldn't be interested only in truth. We're not interesting only in what theories are true, but also the signifance of those truths and how they relate. Studying Lewis might give you insight even if not truth.
Even if it were true that Lewis is unlikely to have said anything true, his contribution to philosophy can still have been both productive and insightful.
The question is not whether what we say is false, but whether or not it is false in an interesting way. (Can anyone remind me where I'm paraphrasing from there?)

A couple of points
Wow! Yesterday I was quoted in Philosophy Etc and today I'm quoted in Al's Notepad. What an honour!
A couple of points. First, my thought experiment was intended to support the hypothesis that Lewis's views are no more likely to be true than those of less successful philosophers. And that conclusion was supposed to provide evidence for the claim that academia doesn't reward truth-seeking. I didn't mean to imply that Lewis's work is a waste of time. In fact, I'm not sure what that statement means. It might mean that we can do better things with our time than reading Lewis. I regard this proposition as not only true, but demonstrably so: for instance, we can spend that time making money which we could then use to buy lots of good. Then again, the statement might instead mean that there are no reasons whatever to read Lewis—that the act of reading him has no normatively redeeming features. I'm agnostic about this proposition, since I only think we have reasons to make things go best and I don't know whether there is any good that the act of reading Lewis realizes. (I do claim to know that, if reading Lewis realizes any good at all, it is definitely outweighed by the good produced by other, more efficient possible activities. I don't need to know whether something is valuable to know that, if it were valuable, it would only contain a modest amount of value.)
Secondly, I agree that philosophers shouldn't only be interested in truth. My own view is that there are, in fact, no normative reasons for believing the truth at all; truth it is only instrumentally valuable, though generally much more valuable than other instrumental values. And there are certainly values other than truth that philosophers could realize. One of them, as you note, is the value of intellectual understanding. I don't think that many of the attributes that philosophers value, however, have any value whatsoever, whether intrinsic or instrumental. I listed some of those in my comments to Richard's post, and I stand by what I said there.
"that conclusion was
"that conclusion was supposed to provide evidence for the claim that academia doesn't reward truth-seeking"
This conclusion by itself, I can accept. But I took the thread to be presupposing that academia should reward truth-seeking, and only truth-seeking, which strikes me as false.
As to what that "should" means, I take it as some kind of institutional, or political should, and not the moral one. I can't expand more than that without taking us way off on a tangent.
Finally, I'll dispute the value of elegance sometime soon in a seperate post: I'd been meaning to do so anyway.
Alex