Was Smith's "Moral Problem" anticipated?

"[W]e appear to have the following dilemma. If practical rationality and morality are a matter of reason or cognition, which are objective and universal, they must lack the power to motivate, since that power depends upon the presence of the relevant contingent desires. If, on the other hand, practical (including moral) reasoning is confined within the limits of the agent's contingent desires, there can be no universal or objective reasons for action. Hence either objective reasons exist but lack the power to motivate, which seems absurd, or reasons are not objective but merely a function of an agent's actual desires. [...] Nagel would appear to have a way out of this dilemma [he rejects the Humean view]."
(Bond, Reason and Value (1983), p6-7)

Either we are cognitivist externalists, or we hold that practical requirements are requirements of desire (very roughly, non-cognitivism), or otherwise we must be anti-Humeans.

(Posting may be sporadic for a little while. The power supply on my computer worryingly smells of burnt plastic, so my own PC is out of use until I fix the problem.)